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This paper develops an open economy portfolio balance model with en-
dogenous asset supply. Domestic producers choose an optimal capital
structure and finance capital goods through credit, bonds and equity as-
sets. Private households hold a portfolio of domestic and foreign assets,
shift balances depending on risk-return considerations, and maximise real
consumption in accordance with the law of one price.
Within this general equilibrium model, it will be shown that central bank
interventions may promote an inefficient international allocation of real
capital. The application of expansive monetary interventions throughout
the course of economic crises maintains the domestic stock of real capital
at the cost of inflation, currency devaluation, distortions of interest rates
and asset prices, and risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet.
Exchange rate stabilising interventions have the result that the central
bank can also stabilise the domestic stock of real capital. However, such
interventions produce either risk clusters on the central bank’s balance
sheet or changes in the domestic price level.
JEL: E10, E44, E52
Keywords: portfolio balance, monetary policy, real capital, macroeco-
nomic risk, exchange rate
Portfolio balance models have a long history in economic research and are widely used to
explain the characteristics of exchange rates. The first significant models were developed,
for example, by Grubel (1968), Dornbusch (1975), Girton and Henderson (1976), Branson
(1977), Lucas (1982), Tobin (1983), Allen and Kenen (1983), and Branson and Henderson
(1985). Within these models, private households choose an optimal portfolio based on
risk-return considerations. This portfolio contains domestic and foreign assets, which are
seen as imperfect substitutes. Other influential portfolio models, such as Tobin (1969)
and Backus et al. (1980), only take domestic assets into account.
In the context of monetary policy, portfolio balance models are able to explain, through
risk differences, why interest rate differentials may persist vis-a`-vis the base country in the
case of pegged floats and fixed exchange rate regimes (Frankel et al., 2004; Shambaugh,
2004; Obstfeld et al., 2005). However, Obstfeld (2004) remarks that further research
is required as to date there is “no integrative general-equilibrium monetary model of
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international portfolio choice, although we need one”. Recent research has analysed the
impact of different types of macroeconomic shocks on asset prices, the exchange rate and
capital flows (Hau and Rey, 2006; Devereux and Sutherland, 2007; Gourinchas and Rey,
2007; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007; Tille, 2008; Tille and van Wincoop, 2010), and placed
emphasis on trying to explain the home bias in asset holdings (Heathcote and Perri, 2009,
and references cited therein).
This paper considers the origin of financial assets and the implications this has for
monetary policy transmission. To date, the amount of bonds and equity assets has not
been treated as endogenous in the portfolio balance literature, with the exception of
Tobin (1983) and Devereux and Saito (2006), whose asset supply still lacks microeco-
nomic foundation.1 Neither the determinants of producers’ capital structure nor the
special characteristics of equity assets are considered. The model developed here fills this
gap. Looking at the economic literature, it is argued that producers maximise firm value
and choose an optimal capital structure in accordance with the static trade-off theory
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), preferring the type of debt
financing which requires the lowest capital costs (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). Further-
more, equity assets contain call options on producers’ real capital goods (Merton, 1974),
and private households optimise their consumption of domestic and foreign goods through
the law of one price. These relationships are integrated into a portfolio balance model of
an open economy by strictly considering the balance sheet restrictions economic actors
are facing in stock and flow figures, a requirement stressed by Brainard and Tobin (1968).
Sims (1980) also sees this as necessary in order to avert a “bad system of restrictions”.
This approach reveals that portfolio adjustments have an impact on the domestic stock
of real capital and consequently affect real domestic production. Since the central bank
is able to influence the portfolio composition of private households through monetary
interventions, the central bank has an indirect impact on the real economy. This impact
needs to be considered if monetary policy trade-offs are to be comprehensively analysed
in the context of portfolio balance models. Therefore, it is advisable to endogenise the
domestic asset supply, as is done in this paper.
The derived model is very useful in analysing the impact of conventional and unconven-
tional expansive monetary interventions that have been applied by central banks during
the current financial crisis (Klyuev et al., 2009). In times of crisis, a relative increase
in the domestic macroeconomic risk level is prevalent (Schwert, 1989; Mishkin, 2001;
Angeletos and Werning, 2006). Thus, the relative attractiveness of domestic investment
declines compared to foreign investment. By analysing the model’s results, one sees that
this is followed by a long term reduction in the domestic stock of real capital. However, if
the central bank reacts with open market purchases of domestic bonds or with an increase
in the supply of credit, it takes on domestic risk on its balance sheet. Through expansive
1Tobin (1983) assumes that the domestic assets supply depends on the replacement costs of capital
goods. Devereux and Saito (2006) assume that the supply of domestic bonds is determined by the bond
interest rate.
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monetary interventions, the central bank reduces the domestic risk premium and conse-
quently prevents domestic disinvestment. There are related side effects, however, such as
domestic inflation, currency devaluation, distortions in domestic interest rates and asset
prices, and risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet.
Moreover, the model illustrates the trade-offs that, for example, the Swiss National
Bank (2011) has recently decided to accept through enforcing a minimum exchange rate
of 1.20 Swiss Franc per Euro. Within the model, central banks are able to stabilise the
exchange rate in reaction to external shocks through interventions in credit, domestic
bond, and foreign asset markets. However, it is essential to choose the right intervention
strategy due to the different causes of exchange rate fluctuations. Sterilised interventions
are required and are only sustainably effective if changes in the foreign interest rate
or in the relative macroeconomic risk are the cause of the fluctuation. Non-sterilised
interventions only work in the case of changes in the relative price level. Both types of
intervention have the side effect that they can also avert adjustments in the domestic
stock of real capital. Furthermore, sterilised interventions promote risk clusters on the
central bank’s balance sheet, whereas non-sterilised interventions are primarily connected
to changes in the domestic price level.
In sum, both expansive monetary interventions, being applied during economic crises,
and exchange rate stabilising interventions can prevent economically appropriate adjust-
ments in the domestic stock of real capital, which comes with a cost to foreign investment.
The result is that these central bank interventions can cause an inefficient international
allocation of real capital and may therefore lead to a negative impact on world welfare.
The paper is structured as follows; chapter I deals with the general model frame-
work, followed by a detailed definition of the model assumptions. Thereupon, the model
is solved and the different transmission channels of exogenous shocks are presented in
chapter II. In chapter III, the trade-offs involved with monetary policy interventions
are analysed. The extent to which expansive monetary interventions are able to neu-
tralise the impact of an increase in domestic macroeconomic risk is discussed, and the
possibilities available to avert exchange rate fluctuations are presented. Furthermore, im-
pulse responses based on vector autoregressive estimations for three European countries
are conducted for periods when pegged exchange rates existed, i. e., Austria (1989M06 -
1998M12), Belgium (1989M10 - 1998M12), and Denmark (1999M02 - 2011M3), provid-
ing empirical support for the theoretical assumptions. Reasons as to why simplifications
do not reduce the general validity of the model are reconsidered in chapter IV, and the
results are then summarised in the concluding chapter V.
I. Model Structure
A. General Framework
The architecture of the model is comparable to that of a Roman temple (see figure
1). It consists of one roof, that being the stock-flow consistent macroeconomic balance
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framework, which is sustained by three pillars. Each pillar represents an optimisation
behaviour that is again based on a distinct microeconomic foundation.
Figure 1. : Model Structure
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static trade-off theory
Each actor in the open economy considered, those being the central bank, producers,
and private households, faces a balance sheet restriction, which shows its stock figures in
the form of assets and liabilities, and an income balance restriction, which incorporates its
specific inflows and outflows. The central bank represents the banking sector supplying
credit, as well as trading domestic bonds and foreign assets in return for domestic money.2
The producers generate real domestic production through the use of real capital. Real
capital is the only factor of production and is financed by credit, bonds, and equity
assets. Real domestic production consists of one single and homogenous good, which is
also produced abroad. This good may either be used as real capital in the production
process or be consumed by private households. Private households consume domestic
and foreign goods and hold their wealth in the form of an asset portfolio. It is composed
of the following gross substitutes; domestic money, domestic bonds, domestic equity, and
foreign assets. The prices of domestic goods and financial assets are flexible. Domestic
bonds and foreign assets are fixed interest bearing, whereas domestic equity assets pay out
varying dividends. For the sake of simplicity, domestic actors are not able to influence
variables of the foreign country, while foreign actors neither hold domestic assets nor
consume domestic goods.
Each of the three optimisation behaviours implies that domestic actors maximise their
utility with regard to one of three distinct economic areas, i. e., wealth management, con-
sumption composition, and corporate financing. In accordance with Markowitz’s (1952)
portfolio selection, private households optimise their wealth structure in line with their
2Commercial banks are not explicitly considered since this would increase the complexity of the model
without having an impact on the direction of the model results. For the same reason, the producers are
not separated into government and private companies. See chapter IV and figure A.1 of the appendix
for an in-depth discussion of this aspect.
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risk-return objectives. Private households have direct access to the financial market and
are therefore able to adjust their portfolio composition immediately. Furthermore, pri-
vate households optimise their consumption composition and maximise real consumption
of domestic and foreign goods following the law of one price. Producers optimise their
capital structure and maximise firm value in accordance with the static trade-off theory
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, consumption op-
timisation and capital structure optimisation are connected to changes in the amount
of domestic assets and producers’ amount of real capital. These adjustments are time
consuming and therefore not possible in the short term. Consequently, purchasing power
parity and an optimal capital structure only persist in the long term.
Through these assumptions, four general equilibrium conditions for the money, do-
mestic bond, domestic dividend, and foreign asset markets are obtained. These can be
simultaneously solved for the reactions of the endogenous variables in the short term and
the long term, respectively. An overview of all exogenous (roof-headed) and constant
(line-headed) variables can be found in table A.1, and of all endogenous variables in table
A.2, of the appendix. In the following sections, the assumptions are specified in detail.
B. Actors and Balance Restrictions
Central Bank
The central bank is the actor capable of conducting monetary policy operations. De-
pending on the preferred exchange rate regime, its main policy target may be either
exchange rate stability or the stability of other variables like the domestic price level, real
domestic production, or domestic interest rates. It is assumed that the central bank com-
pletely controls three variables which it uses independently to fulfil its mandate. First, it
may change the volume of credit it supplies to producers (K̂).3 Second, it is able to buy
or sell domestic bonds (n̂BCB), and third, it can trade foreign bonds it holds as currency
reserves (n̂FCB) in return for domestic money (M).
In total, the central bank holds assets in domestic currency to the value of the credit
amount (K̂), the central bank’s domestic bonds (BCB), and foreign assets (sFCB). Given
that pB denotes the price of one domestic bond, s the exchange rate in direct quotation,
and pF the price of one foreign asset in foreign currency, it holds that:
BCB = n̂BCB ⋅ p
B(1)
sFCB = n̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ p
F(2)
3Naturally, commercial banks supply credit to the producers within an economy. However, the central
bank has a key impact on the amount of lending because it supplies credit to these commercial banks.
Since the commercial banks are not considered in the model for the sake of simplicity, it is reasonable to
assume that the central bank determines the credit supply (see figure A.1 of the appendix). Thereby, it
is implied that the central bank represents the economy’s aggregated banking sector within the model.
For further discussion of this, see chapter IV.
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In terms of liabilities, the central bank holds money (M) and net assets (NetA). Con-
sequently, the balance sheet restriction of the central bank is:
(3) K̂ +BCB + sFCB =M +NetA
While the amount of money changes with the amount of credit, the amount of domestic
bonds, or the amount of foreign assets, the net assets change if profits or losses occur due
to a change in the valuation of domestic bonds or foreign assets:
dM = dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ p
B
+ dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ p
F(4)
dNetA = dpB ⋅ n̂BCB + dp
F
⋅ s ⋅ n̂FCB + ds ⋅ p
F
⋅ n̂FCB(5)
Equations 4 and 5 comprise the fundamental relations of the balance approach. Each
increase in the amount of assets needs to be financed by an increase in the amount of
liabilities4, whereas an increase in the valuation of assets only positively affects the value
of liabilities5, without any impact on their amount, and vice versa.
Consequently, the total supply of domestic money (Ms) is completely controlled by
the central bank. It is determined by the initial amount of money (M) plus the changes
in the money amount (see equation 4) caused by monetary policy interventions:
(6) Ms =M + dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ p
B
+ dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ p
F
Since the assets of the central bank bear interest, the central bank receives interest
income (iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅ BCB + îF ⋅ sFCB). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
the central bank distributes its interest income immediately to the private households.6
Thus, the central bank’s balance of income is always balanced.
Private Households
It is assumed that private households hold their aggregated wealth (W ) in the form
of the domestic money amount (M), domestic bonds (BP ), domestic equity (E)
7, and
foreign assets (sFP ). The value of each holding in domestic currency (BP , E, sFP ) is the
amount of private households’ assets (nBP , n
E , nFP ) multiplied by the relevant asset price
4The central bank is only able to adjust its amount of liabilities by changing the domestic money
amount M .
5Since money is the numeraire, the value of money does not vary in absolute terms. Consequently,
the residual position of net assets NetA adjusts if the value of assets (measured in domestic currency)
changes.
6This assumption does not reduce the general validity of the model seeing as in practice, the income
of central banks is normally distributed to the respective governments, who then transfer it to private
households, e. g., through salary payments or social benefits.
7Private households hold the total amount of domestic equity assets since the central bank does not
hold domestic equity assets and foreign investors do not hold domestic assets at all. Therefore, E = EP
and, respectively, nE = nEP .
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in domestic currency (pB , pE , s ⋅ pF ):
BP = nBP ⋅ p
B(7)
E = nE ⋅ pE(8)
sFP = nFP ⋅ s ⋅ p
F(9)
Hence, the balance sheet restriction of private households is expressed by:
(10) M +BP +E + sFP =W
It follows that private households’ wealth either changes with a varying amount or a
varying valuation of domestic or foreign assets.
The nominal income of the private households is the sum of domestic interest payments
(iB ⋅BP ), domestic dividend payments (Div ∶= iE ⋅E), foreign interest payments (îF ⋅sFP ),
and central bank distribution (iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅BCB + îF ⋅ sFCB):
IncP = iB ⋅BP +Div + îF ⋅ sFP + iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅BCB + îF ⋅ sFCB(11)
Below, it is assumed that the private households use all their income for the consump-
tion of either domestic goods (CD) or foreign goods (CF ):
(12) IncP = CD +CF
Thereby, it is implied that private households do not have any incentive to shift con-
sumption inter-temporarily through saving or dissaving. Furthermore, their balance of
income is balanced.
Producers
Each producer in the economy produces a homogeneous good in a competitive environ-
ment. The homogenous good can either be consumed by private households or be used
as a factor of production by the producers.8 Capital, in terms of real capital goods, is
considered as the only factor of production, and each producer finances its capital goods
through credit, bonds, or equity assets. Consequently, the producers’ balance restric-
tion expresses that the aggregated value of domestic capital goods (CG) is equal to the
aggregated value of domestic credit (K̂), domestic bonds (B), and domestic equity (E):
(13) CG = K̂ +B +E
8If the good is used in the production process, it becomes worn out and therefore depreciates over
time.
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The implicit value of one capital good (valCG) is the total value divided by the real
amount (nCG):
(14) valCG =
CG
nCG
Naturally, the real amount of domestic capital goods is connected to producers’ amount
of liabilities (determined by K̂, nB , and nE). With respect to the short term, it is assumed
that producers’ amount of liabilities is constant. The economic reason for this is that it
takes time to negotiate loan agreements, as well as to issue or reduce the number of bonds
and equity assets. The rationale here is substantiated in detail in section D. If producers
take on additional credit or issue additional assets over the long term, they acquire the
financial means to increase real investment, and vice versa. The consequence is that in
the long term, producers’ stock of real capital goods (nCG) changes by the value of the
change in the amount of liabilities (dK̂ +dnB ⋅ pB +dnE ⋅ pE) divided by the price level of
domestic goods (p):
(15) dnCG =
dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE
p
The producers generate income9 to the amount of nominal domestic production (Y ),
which consists of the domestic price level (p) multiplied by real domestic production (Y r):
(16) Y = Y r ⋅ p
Real domestic production depends on the amount of real capital goods held by the
producers. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
and constant total factor productivity (a), a linear relation between Y r and nCG results
in the current case, with real capital being the only factor of production:10
(17) Y r = a ⋅ nCG
Moreover, since capital is the only factor of production, producers’ income in its entirety
is used to remunerate the lenders of capital:
(18) Y = iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅B +Div
9The term ‘income’ is used in the sense of value added. In line with the model, this is equal to
producers’ revenue less the depreciations on capital investment.
10The amount of producers’ liabilities does not change in the short term. Thus, it follows from
equation 15 that in the short term dnCG = 0, and consequently, dY r = 0. However, if an exogenous shock
affects the economy, nCG may change during the transition process towards a new long term equilibrium
since producers’ amount of liabilities may adjust. Consequently, Y r may change in the long term. The
rationale for these relationships is substantiated in section D.
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Consequently, producers’ inflows are constantly equal to producers’ outflows.
Consolidated Balances
Given the balance equations of the open economy’s three actors (see overview in table
1), as well as the following relations:
B = BP +BCB nB = nBP + n̂BCB B = p
B
⋅ nB(19)
F = FP + FCB nF = nFP + n̂FCB F = p
F
⋅ nF(20)
one finds that through consolidation, the value of domestic capital goods (CG) and
the value of foreign assets held by domestic actors in domestic currency (sF ) are equal
to the aggregated domestic wealth (W +NetA):
(21) CG + sF =W +NetA
Since all balances of income are balanced11, the aggregated balance of income is also
balanced.
Table 1—The Balance Sheets of the Economic Actors
Central Bank (Eq. 3) Private Households (Eq. 10)
assets liabilities assets liabilities
K̂ M M W
BCB = pB ⋅ n̂BCB NetA BP = p
B
⋅ nBP
sFCB = s ⋅ pF ⋅ n̂FCB E =
Div
iE
sFP = s ⋅ pF ⋅ nFP
Producers (Eq. 13)
assets liabilities
CG = valCG ⋅ nCG K̂
pB ⋅ nB = B
Div
iE
= E
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consolidated (Eq. 21)
assets liabilities
CG = valCG ⋅ nCG W
sF = s ⋅ pF ⋅ nF NetA
11The income of the central bank is distributed to private households. Private households’ income
is equal to their consumption expenditures (see equation 12). Producers distribute nominal domestic
production to the lenders of capital, i. e., central bank and private households (see equation 18).
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C. Prices of Domestic Bonds, Foreign Assets, and Domestic Goods
As is the case in traditional finance, the price of a financial asset is determined by
the present value of its future cash flow. Concerning domestic bonds, it is assumed that
the time to maturity of an average domestic bond is indefinite. Therefore, the cash flow
of one fixed interest bearing domestic bond is characterised by a constant perpetuity of
coupon payments (qBt+n = qB for n = 0,1, ...,∞). By implying that interest rates are
positive and that the term structure of interest rates is flat, the price of one domestic
bond in domestic currency (pB) is:
(22) pB =
qB
iB
The price of one foreign asset in foreign currency (pF ) results analogically:
(23) pF =
qF
îF
Whereas the price level of foreign goods (p̂∗) is exogenously given, it is assumed that
the price level of domestic goods (p) is determined through the relations of the Quantity
Theory. The Quantity Equation expresses that the domestic money amount (M) is used
with a constant velocity (v) in order to conduct a desired amount of real domestic good
transactions (approximated by Y r), which are connected to the domestic price level (p):
(24) M ⋅ v = p ⋅ Y r
Consequently, the domestic price level is determined by:
(25) p =
M ⋅ v
Y r
D. Domestic Asset Supply
The Optimal Capital Structure
Producers finance themselves through capital forms debt (K̂ + B) and equity (E).
According to the static trade-off theory, an optimal debt to equity ratio exists when
producer value (K̂ + B + E) is maximised. It focuses on the benefits and costs of debt
financing.
First, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the capital structure is irrelevant for
firms’ total value. However, this is not the case if the general framework is extended
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to include taxes, agency costs, and costs of financial distress. Primarily, the use of
debt is favoured if interest payments can be deducted from corporate tax (Modigliani
and Miller, 1963). In addition, debt financing reduces the agency conflict between firms’
managers and shareholders. Managers have the incentive to misuse a firm’s free cash flow
on supplementary grants and unprofitable investment at the expense of equity holders.
Debt financing reduces the free cash flow available to managers, thereby limiting this
agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). However, issuing debt causes
agency costs due to conflicts between shareholders and debtors (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Furthermore, there are other costs associated with issuing debt, i. e., the costs
of financial distress (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 1977). These costs will arise if
a firm uses excessive debt, putting it in danger of failing to meet interest and principal
payments. Even before bankruptcy, costs occur because a firm in distress will lose valuable
customers, creditors, employees, and suppliers to more secure competitors.
Even though taxes, agency costs, and the risk of bankruptcy are not explicitly modeled,
they can be seen as the reason why a target capital structure exists, which the producers
tend to achieve. By implying that taxes and agency costs do not change, the costs of
financial distress are higher the lower producers’ income (Y ) is, and the higher producers’
interest payments on debt capital (iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB) are. The optimal capital structure
is achieved when the marginal benefits of debt financing are equal to the marginal costs
of financial distress. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that this is the case if the
debt capital costs reach a certain proportion (dc) of producers’ income (Y ):
iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB = dc ⋅ Y(26)
0 < dc < 1
If iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB > dc ⋅ Y , the marginal benefits of debt financing are lower than the
marginal costs, and producers tend to reduce leverage over time. The reverse relationship
also holds.
Domestic Bond Supply and Credit Demand
The macroeconomic literature offers both the credit view and themoney view to charac-
terise producers’ choice of debt capital (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bolton and Freixas,
2006). In a nutshell, the credit view implies that firms cannot easily substitute bank
loans for bonds. Economic reasons for this are, for example, that assessments of credit-
worthiness or the issuance of bonds are time consuming, as well as credit agreements and
bond issues having a time constraint. Hence, the money view considers bank loans and
bonds to be perfect substitutes since both are similar forms of debt capital.
Below, it is assumed that producers’ choice of debt capital follows the credit view in
the short term so that bond supply and credit demand are constant. Consequently, pro-
ducers’ short term supply of domestic bonds vis-a`-vis the private households is implicitly
expressed by equation 19. It is the total amount of domestic bonds (nB) less the holdings
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of the central bank (n̂BCB):
(27) (nBP )
s = nB − n̂BCB
Regarding the credit market, the credit view implies that the central bank faces a con-
stant demand for credit in the short term, thus being able to cause infinite changes in the
credit interest rate through infinitesimal changes in the credit supply. As a consequence,
the credit interest rate (iK) can be arbitrarily set. Therefore, it can be considered as
exogenously determined by the central bank’s monetary policy interventions in the short
term. As a result, the target capital structure of the producers is not necessarily matched
in the short term because deviations from equation 26 are possible.12
Hence, credit demand and bond supply become more and more elastic over time, as
indicated by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap et al. (1993). In the long term,
it is therefore reasonable to assume that the money view holds, eventually allowing the
producers to adjust their capital structure until it reaches its optimum following the
rationale of the static trade-off theory.13 Thereby, it is implied that over the long term
producers invest efficiently in order to obtain the highest possible output (see equation
17), given the financial constraint expressed in equation 26. In other words, producers
maximise the amount of real capital goods (nCG) they are able to finance through debt
capital ( K̂+B
p
) in accordance with equation 26. It follows that producers’ demand for
credit (Kd) and supply of domestic bonds ((nB)s) negatively depend on the credit interest
rate (iK). The reason for this is that an increase in the credit interest rate increases debt
capital costs, with producers tending to reduce the total amount of debt liabilities to again
reach their optimal debt capital budget (dc ⋅ Y ).14 In addition, the demand for credit
positively depends, and the supply of bonds negatively, on the interest rate difference
between the bond interest rate and the credit interest rate (iB − iK). This is due to the
resulting arbitrage behaviour. If the interest rate on credit is higher than that on bonds,
producers issue additional bonds and try to substitute the relatively expensive credit to
maximise K̂+B
p
, and vice versa. Consequently, during the transition process towards an
12Since K̂ and nB are constant in the short term due to the credit view, the producers are not able
to avert an increase in the debt capital costs (iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅nB) if the central bank increases iK , and vice
versa. Thus, it is not possible that equation 26 holds in any short term situation.
13Maximising the firm value through an optimal capital structure, which will be obtained if equation
26 is satisfied.
14This effect is comparable to the income effect with regard to the consumption of two goods. If the
price of one good increases (here: increase in iK), the demand for both goods (here: credit demand and
bond supply) decreases.
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optimal amount of debt capital, the following equations hold:
Kd =K(iK , iB − iK)(28)
∂Kd
∂iK
< 0, ∂K
d
∂(iB−iK)
> 0
(nB)s = nB(iK , iB − iK)(29)
∂nB
∂iK
< 0, ∂n
B
∂(iB−iK)
< 0
The money view implies that credit demand and bond supply adjust until bond and
credit interest rates are equal in the long term. Thus, the long-term optimum is charac-
terised by budget constraint 26, equilibrium on the credit market (equation 30), and the
bond and credit interest rates being equal (equation 31).
Kd = K̂(30)
iK = iB(31)
By solving equations 26, 30, and 31 for nB , under consideration of equations 16 and
24, it implicitly follows for producers’ long term total supply of domestic bonds that:
(32) (nB)s =
dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂
qB
Consequently, producers’ long term supply of domestic bonds vis-a`-vis the private
households is the total supply, less the holdings of the central bank:
(33) (nBP )
s =
dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂
qB
− n̂BCB
Domestic Equity Assets
The price of one domestic equity asset (pE) is the net present value of its dividend cash
flow. By assumption, dividend payments are positive and private households regard the
dividend cash flow as a constant perpetuity (divt+n = div for n = 0,1, ...,∞). Furthermore,
the equity discount rate is positive and its term structure is flat. Accordingly, the price
of one domestic equity asset (pE) is:
(34) pE =
div
iE
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Hence, the dividend payment per equity asset (div) is the aggregated amount of do-
mestic dividend payments (Div ∶= iE ⋅ E) divided by the total amount of equity assets
(nE):
(35) div =
Div
nE
Taking the producers’ income (equation 18), the aggregated domestic dividend pay-
ments (Div) have to be equal to producers’ residual income (Magni, 2009).15 By trans-
posing equation 18 under consideration of equation 16, it follows in general that:
(36) Div = p ⋅ Y r − iK ⋅ K̂ − iB ⋅B
Taking equations 19, 22, and Quantity Equation 24, it follows for the short term
that Div is completely determined by variables which are constant (v, K̂, qB , nB) or
exogenously determined by the domestic central bank (M , iK):
(37) Div =M ⋅ v − iK ⋅ K̂ − qB ⋅ nB
This also turns out to be the case in the long term, seeing as through consideration of
the producers’ target capital structure constraint in equation 26, one obtains:
(38) Div =M ⋅ v ⋅ (1 − dc)
If domestic equity assets are compared with domestic bonds and foreign assets, what
they have in common is that their values only depend on their cash flows, not on the
amount of real capital goods held by domestic or foreign producers (see equations 22, 23,
and 34). However, they are also different in several crucial ways. The cash flow stream of
domestic bonds is given by qB and is independent of other variables. If domestic producers
are able to issue additional domestic bonds (increase in nB) without affecting the interest
rate (iB)16, the aggregated value of domestic bonds (B) increases (see equations 19 and
22). This is not the case for domestic equity assets. Producers cannot change the total
equity value through an issue or buyback of equity assets since the aggregated amount
of dividend payments (Div) is independent of the amount of equity assets in the short
term, as well as in the long term (see equations 37 and 38). If producers increase the
amount of equity assets, the amount of nominal dividend payments on each equity asset
decreases proportionally and thus, the price of each equity asset decreases proportionally
15To determine dividend payments within a portfolio model, an equivalent approach is applied by Tille
(2008).
16An increase in nB is considered given the ceteris paribus assumption. Consequently, it is implied
that the demand for domestic bonds is completely elastic; this is generally not the case, but is assumed
for this gedankenexperiment.
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given an unchanged discount rate (iE). In sum, the aggregated value of domestic equity
(E) remains unchanged.
The structure of ownership rights is another difference between domestic bonds and
equity assets. Merton (1974) maintains that each equity asset is considered to contain
a call option on producers’ assets, i. e., producers’ real capital goods. By exercising this
option, they receive real goods to the value of the current equity price (see equation
15). In the following analysis, the opposite relationship is also assumed, i. e., real goods
contain call options on equity assets. Thus, private households have the ability to redeem
a proportion of their equity assets in return for real goods on the one hand or exchange
a part of their real income for equity assets on the other. While this assumption seems
unfamiliar at first, it becomes clear when bringing to mind how different mechanisms can
be used to redeem or generate equity assets in practice, given a fixed amount of liabilities.
The first possibility is a change in the stocks of produced goods. If stocks are reduced,
equity capital is released, whereas if stocks are increased, additional equity capital is
bounded given an unchanged amount of liabilities. The second possibility is the depre-
ciation channel. If depreciations on real capital are not entirely replaced, equity capital
is released and the cash flow from investing increases. If producers’ cash flow is used
for additional investment on the other hand, additional equity is bounded. The third
possibility is a direct exchange of equity with the producers. Although owners of small
private companies are able to personally draw or contribute equity capital relatively eas-
ily, the more coordination that is required, the higher the likelihood that partners will
be present. For instance, shareholders of corporations have to decide at general meetings
whether stocks should be repurchased or issued.
Since all three procedures are time consuming, it is reasonable to assume that private
households are only gradually able to redeem or contribute equity over the long term.
Therefore, the amount of equity assets is considered constant in the short term and may
change over time.
Below, it needs to be discussed what incentives private households have to exchange
equity assets for real goods, and vice versa. Generally, it is reasonable to assume that pri-
vate households consume in an efficient way insofar that they maximise the real amount
of consumption (CD
p
+
CF
p̂∗⋅s
) given their budget constraint. At any time, their budget con-
straint is expressed by their income balance restriction (equation 12). Taking equations
11, 18, 19, and 20 into account, it follows that private households’ budget constraint can
be expressed by:
(39) Y + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF = CD +CF
To maximise real consumption, private households compare the price level of domestic
goods with the price level of foreign goods in domestic currency. If the price levels are
different, private households accordingly shift their consumption to the relatively cheaper
good. Consequently, the composition of consumption depends on the real exchange rate
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(sreal), which is the quotient of the foreign price level in domestic currency (p̂∗ ⋅ s) and
the domestic price level (p):
(40) sreal =
p̂∗ ⋅ s
p
If sreal = 1, the law of one price holds in terms of purchasing power parity, and private
households are indifferent to the consumption of either domestic or foreign goods. If pri-
vate households were to consume more domestic goods than are domestically produced
(CD > Y ), they would respectively consume less foreign goods than foreign interest pay-
ments (CF < s⋅qF ⋅nF ) according to income balance restriction 39. The domestic economy
would experience a current account surplus17, which would be associated with an excess
supply of foreign currency, leading to an appreciation of the domestic currency (decrease
in s). Thus, domestic goods would become relatively expensive (sreal would decrease),
and private households would adjust the composition of their consumption until purchas-
ing power parity were again to hold in conjunction with an equilibrium on the foreign
exchange market (balanced current account). Consequently, long term equilibrium is in-
evitably associated with purchasing power parity and a balanced current account, insofar
that private households consume domestic goods to the value of domestic production (Y ),
and foreign goods to the value of foreign interest payments (s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF ).
If sreal > 1 in a situation without long term equilibrium, domestic goods are relatively
cheaper, and private households tend to substitute foreign goods for domestic goods in
order to maximise real consumption. However, if they do so, the result is that they
require more domestic goods than are domestically produced (in accordance with income
balance restriction 39). This can be overcome in two ways; on the one hand, domestic
goods can be released in the long term if domestic producers reduce their amount of debt
liabilities (see equation 15); on the other hand, private households have the possibility to
carry out additional domestic consumption themselves, since in the long term they are
able to redeem equity assets in return for domestic real goods from the producers.
If domestic goods are relatively expensive compared to foreign goods (sreal < 1), do-
mestic private households tend to consume less domestic goods than are domestically
produced, exchanging the surplus in return for equity assets. During the transition pro-
cess towards a long term equilibrium with purchasing power parity and a balanced current
account, the following relationship holds accordingly:
CD = Y − dK̂ − dnB ⋅ pB − dnE ⋅ pE(41)
dnE
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
< 0 if sreal > 1
> 0 if sreal < 1
= 0 else
17The current account consists of the trade account plus the account of international interest payments.
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E. Balance of Payments and Foreign Asset Supply
Balance of Payments
Through the consumption behaviour of private households, it follows that in long term
equilibrium, the current account is balanced. Since in long term equilibrium the domestic
amount of foreign assets does not change, the capital account is also balanced, with the
result being a balanced balance of payments:
(42) 0 = CD − Y = −CF + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF
Equation 42 also holds under the occurrence of an exogenous shock. This is because the
total amount of credit, domestic bonds, and equity is constant in the short term, given
the economic reasons in section D.
During the transition process towards long term equilibrium, the current account may
be positive or negative. Since the balance of payments is constantly balanced (Meade,
1951), it is a necessary condition that a positive current account is accompanied by a
negative capital account corresponding to the same amount. A positive current account
arises if domestic goods are relatively cheaper compared to foreign goods (sreal > 1), in
accordance with private households’ consumption behaviour (see equation 41). Following
private households’ budget constraint 39, less than the total amount of foreign interest
income is utilised for the consumption of foreign goods. The residual foreign interest
income is then used to acquire foreign assets, causing a capital account deficit equal
to the current account surplus. The opposite holds, if sreal < 1. During the transition
process towards long term equilibrium, the balance of payments restriction is consequently
expressed by:
(43) 0 = CD − Y + dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE = −CF + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF − dnF ⋅ s ⋅ pF
While the value of the current account during the transition process is explained by
private households’ consumption behaviour, the value of the capital account has yet to
be explained. What are the incentives for private households to use positive or negative
residual foreign interest income to acquire or sell foreign assets?
A current account surplus brings about an excess supply of foreign currency, which
subsequently causes an appreciation of the domestic currency (decrease in s). Conse-
quently, the amount of foreign assets held in private households’ portfolio loses value in
domestic currency. Hence, the foreign asset portion of the portfolio would become too
small to maintain an optimal portfolio composition. Private households compensate for
this loss in value through increasing the amount of foreign assets they hold. The opposite
occurs if a current account deficit exists.
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These relationships result through private households’ portfolio selection. They will
be described in detail upon specification of the supply of foreign assets in the coming
section.
Foreign Asset Supply
Overall, the supply of foreign assets vis-a`-vis the private households consists of three
parts. First, there is the initial amount of foreign assets held domestically (nF ). The
second part is the holdings of the domestic central bank (n̂FCB), and the third, the changes
in the amount of foreign assets due to fluctuations in the balance of payments (dnF ). From
private households’ budget constraint 39 and the balance of payments restriction 43, it
follows for dnF that:
(44) dnF = −
dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE
s ⋅ pF
As discussed before, the amounts of domestic assets are constant in the short term,
and therefore, dnF = 0 according to equation 44. Consequently, the short term supply of
foreign bonds vis-a`-vis the private households is:
(45) (nFP )
s = nF − n̂FCB
Since the amount of domestic assets may adjust over time, dnF may be positive or
negative in the long term. Consequently, the long term supply of foreign bonds vis-a`-vis
the private households is:
(46) (nFP )
s = nF − n̂FCB + dn
F
F. Portfolio Selection and Money Demand
By assumption, private households are risk averse and optimise their individual as-
set portfolios following the portfolio selection of Markowitz (1952). With respect to its
personal preferences, each household chooses a portfolio which delivers its preferred risk-
return relationship. It is assumed that private households’ preferences are constant over
time, i. e., not changing with the level of wealth. In addition, transaction costs are not
considered. The sum of individual asset holdings corresponds to private households’ ag-
gregated portfolio (M +BP +E + sFP ), which represents private households’ wealth (W )
according to the balance equation 10. The assets within private households’ portfolio are
gross substitutes and the portfolio proportions corresponding to each asset class (m, b,
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e, f) are:
m =
M
W
b =
BP
W
e =
E
W
f =
sFP
W
(47)
m + b + e + f = 1
Given the assets’ risk structure18, private households tend to hold higher proportions
invested in assets with higher expected returns and lower opportunity costs, i. e., the
expected return on alternative assets. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that private
households form static expectations about future asset prices and the future exchange
rate under uncertainty. Accordingly, their expectations do not differ, on average, from
current market values. This implies that at no point in time are changes in asset prices
or in the exchange rate expected (on average) by private households. Consequently, the
expected return on each asset is equal to the corresponding current market level of interest
rates (iB , iE , îF ).
Given the structure of returns, private households tend to increase the fraction they
hold of a specific asset the less it contributes to the total risk of the portfolio, and vice
versa. Besides the individual risk of each asset class, which is at least partly diversifi-
able in the portfolio selection process, it is assumed that domestic and foreign assets are
exposed to systemic risk, which is related to serious disturbances in the corresponding
financial systems. Since systemic risk is considered to affect the entirety of assets in
a particular economy, it is termed macroeconomic risk in this paper. This macroeco-
nomic risk may be driven by financial instability, e. g., caused by regulation procedures
allowing for a lack of transparency and information asymmetries, by political instability,
e. g., caused by national unrest, or even by the risk of natural disasters, e. g., caused by
changes in the environment. Since these are factors which lie beyond the scope of this
model, it is reasonable to assume that the extent of macroeconomic risk is exogenously
given. Here, σ̂ is defined as the difference between domestic and foreign macroeconomic
risk. Consequently, an exogenous increase in σ̂ indicates a relative increase in domestic
macroeconomic risk, whereby all domestic assets become relatively riskier compared to
foreign assets, and vice versa.19
Domestic money is notably different compared to other assets since it is not only part
of the portfolio selection process, but is also used for transaction purposes. Consequently,
private households’ demand for money needs to be consistent with the relations of Quan-
tity Equation 24.20 Accordingly, private households demand more money the higher the
price of one goods transaction (p) is, the more transactions they tend to perform (approx-
18The variance-covariance matrix of asset returns.
19For example, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, it was unclear how the financial systems
of the US and closely connected countries may withstand this shock due to the complex and abstruse
position of Lehman Brothers within their financial industries. This increase in uncertainty compared to
less affected countries would be captured by an increase in σ̂ within the model.
20See the relationships of the real-balance effect and the net-real-financial-asset effect in Patinkin
(1966).
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imated by Y r), and the fewer transactions that are technically possible to carry out in a
certain period of time (v). Altogether, private households tend to hold a higher fraction
of money in their portfolio and decrease the proportions held of remaining assets if p⋅Y
r
v
increases, and vice versa.
In sum, the demand for values according to the different asset classes is given by:
Md =m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(48)
∂m
∂iB
< 0, ∂m
∂iE
< 0, ∂m
∂îF
< 0, ∂m
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂m
∂(
p⋅Y r
v
)
> 0
BdP = b(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(49)
∂b
∂iB
> 0, ∂b
∂iE
< 0, ∂b
∂îF
< 0, ∂b
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂b
∂(
p⋅Y r
v
)
< 0
Ed = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(50)
∂e
∂iB
< 0, ∂e
∂iE
> 0, ∂e
∂îF
< 0, ∂e
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂e
∂(
p⋅Y r
v
)
< 0
sF dP = f(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(51)
∂f
∂iB
< 0, ∂f
∂iE
< 0, ∂f
∂îF
> 0, ∂f
∂σ̂
> 0, ∂f
∂(
p⋅Y r
v
)
< 0
The private households’ demand concerning the quantity of domestic bonds ((nBP )
d)
is derived through dividing BdP by the price of one domestic bond (see equation 22).
Multiplying Ed by the equity discount rate, one gets the demand for domestic dividend
payments (Divd). Through dividing sF dP by the foreign asset price (see equation 23) in
domestic currency, the demand for the quantity of foreign bonds ((nFP )
d) is obtained:
(nBP )
d = b(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
iB
qB
(52)
Divd = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE(53)
(nFP )
d = f(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
îF
s ⋅ qF
(54)
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G. Equilibrium Conditions
Short Term
In the short term, the model shows four equilibrium conditions. Looking at the money
market first, it is necessary under the condition of the Quantity Equation 24 that the
domestic money amount (M) is equal to money demand (see equation 48) and money
supply (see equation 621):
(55) M =
p ⋅ Y r
v
=m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W =M + dn̂BCB ⋅ p
B
+ dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ p
F
Secondly, in reference to the domestic bond market, it is necessary that private house-
holds’ amount of domestic bonds (nBP ) is equal to demand (see equation 52) and short
term supply (see equation 27):
(56) nBP = b(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
iB
qB
= nB − n̂BCB
Thirdly, in the dividend market, it is necessary that private households’ claim for
dividend payments (Div) is equal to their demand (see equation 53), as well as the
amount of dividend payments available in the short term (see equation 37):
(57) Div = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE =M ⋅ v − iK ⋅ K̂ − qB ⋅ nB
Finally, in the foreign asset market, the amount of private households’ foreign assets
(nFP ) must be equal to demand (see equation 54), as well as short term supply (see
equation 45):
(58) nFP = f(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
îF
s ⋅ qF
= nF − n̂FCB
In the short term, the credit amount (K̂) and the amounts of domestic assets (nB , nE)
are considered constant (see rationale in section D). In relation to equation 44, the total
amount of foreign assets consequently remains at the initial level (nF ).
The remaining endogenous variables are the domestic bond interest rate (iB), the
equity discount rate (iE), and the exchange rate (s). Through total differentiation of
the equilibrium conditions 56, 57, and 58, and the following system of linear equations,
the changes in iB , iE , and s can be simultaneously determined. Due to Walras’ Law,
money market condition 55 does not need to be considered. The result is that changes in
21In the short term, dK̂ = 0 (see credit view in section D). Consequently, short term money supply is
M + d̂nB
CB
⋅ pB + d̂nF
CB
⋅ s ⋅ pF .
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(short term) exogenous variables like the interest rate on foreign assets (îF ), the relative
macroeconomic risk (σ̂), the credit interest rate (iK), and the central bank holdings
of domestic bonds (n̂BCB) and foreign assets (n̂
F
CB) affect the endogenous variables and
private households’ wealth (W ) in the short term.
Long Term
In the long term, the money market condition changes slightly compared to the short
term as the central bank is able to adjust credit supply:
(59) M =m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W =
p ⋅ Y r
v
=M + dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ p
B
+ dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ p
F
Moreover, the domestic bond market condition changes as the total supply of domestic
bonds adjusts in the long term (see equation 33):
(60) nBP = b(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
iB
qB
=
dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂
qB
− n̂BCB
The amount of domestic dividend payments adjusts in the long term as well (see equa-
tion 38). Therefore, the equilibrium condition concerning domestic dividend payments
is:
(61) Div = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE =M ⋅ v ⋅ (1 − dc)
In addition, the foreign asset market condition 58 adjusts seeing as the long term supply
of foreign assets is required (see equation 46):
(62) nFP = f(i
B , iE , îF , σ̂,
p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅
îF
s ⋅ qF
= nF − n̂FCB + dn
F
A stable, long term general equilibrium must be associated with purchasing power
parity due to private households’ maximising of real consumption (see page 16 et seq.).
A necessary condition for long term equilibrium (in addition to the market conditions)
is therefore:
(63) s =
p
p̂∗
With regard to the Quantity Equation (equation 24) and the production function
(equation 17), equation 63 can be expressed by:
(64) s =
M ⋅ v
a ⋅ nCG ⋅ p̂∗
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In the long term, changes in nE are derived if changes in nB and nF are determined,
and exogenous changes in K̂ are given (see equation 44). Changes in nBP and n
F
P consist of
exogenous changes in n̂BCB and n̂
F
CB , and endogenous changes in n
B and nF (see equations
19 and 20).
To solve for all endogenous variables, it is therefore sufficient to simultaneously derive
the changes in iB , iE , s, nB , and nF by using the equilibrium conditions 60, 61, and 62,
as well as the purchasing power parity condition 64. This results in changes in most of
the exogenous variables, which also have an impact in the short term (îF , σ̂, n̂BCB , n̂
F
CB),
as well as the credit amount (K̂) and the foreign price level (p̂∗) affecting the endogenous
variables in the long term. Since the domestic asset amounts and therefore the amount
of domestic real capital (nCG) vary in the long term (see equation 15), not only may
private households’ wealth (W ) adjust to changes in the exogenous variables, but also
real domestic production (Y r).
II. Model Solution
A. Fundamental Effects
The impact of changes in exogenous and endogenous variables can be differentiated
by four effects. Three effects are related to the demand side. In the following, these are
termed the allocation effect, wealth effect, and value compensation effect.
The allocation effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand attributed to
private households’ portfolio adjustments. Portfolio adjustments take place if private
households alter the proportions of the assets held in their aggregate portfolio (m, b, e,
and f). For example, if the foreign interest rate (îF ) increases exogenously, a higher
proportion of their portfolio tends to be in foreign assets (f), with a lower proportion of
the remaining assets (m, b, and e), respectively. Consequently, the demand for foreign
assets increases, and the demand for the remaining assets decreases. This relationship
is analogous if an exogenous shock leads, for example, to an endogenous increase in the
domestic bond interest rate (iB). Private households tend to increase b at the cost of m,
e, and f . Since the portfolio proportions depend on iB , iE , îF , σ̂, and p⋅Y
r
v
(see equations
48, 49, 50, and 51), the allocation effect results if changes in these variables occur.
The wealth effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand that occur due to
changes in the total level of private households’ wealth (W ). IfW decreases (e. g., from an
exogenous increase in îF or an endogenous decrease in nBP ), private households’ demand
for quantities of all asset types decreases proportionally, and vice versa (see equations 48,
52, 53, and 54). Since W depends on M , iB , iE , îF , s, nBP , Div, and n
F
P ,
22 the wealth
effect results if changes in these variables take place.
The value compensation effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand that
take place due to changes in the value of one asset type relative to the others. For example,
22Equation 10 can be written as W =M +
nBP ⋅q
B
iB
+
Div
iE
+
nFP ⋅s⋅q
F
îF
.
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if the foreign interest rate (îF ) increases exogenously, the value of foreign assets decreases
by a higher fraction than the total level of private households’ wealth. Consequently, the
proportion of foreign assets (f) decreases relative to the others. To compensate for this
to the extent that the initial portfolio composition is maintained, private households’
demand for foreign assets increases and the demand for the remaining assets decreases,
respectively. In sum, the value compensation effect occurs if changes in iB , iE , îF , or s
take place.
Besides the three demand effects, there is also a supply effect capturing changes in
the amount of assets. For example, the supply of domestic bonds decreases vis-a`-vis
the private households if the central bank increases its amount of domestic bonds (see
equations 27 and 33). All in all, the supply effect is present if changes in M , nBP , Div,
and nFP take place.
B. Impact of Changes in Exogenous Variables
General Outline
Changes in exogenous variables cause demand or supply effects which lead to excess
demand or excess supply on the respective asset markets. Consequently, the endogenous
variables adjust in order to produce opposing demand and supply effects that compensate
for the imbalances, thus achieving general equilibrium once again. To determine the ex-
ogenous impacts, the equilibrium conditions are totally differentiated, and the respective
systems of linear equations for the short term and the long term are solved. Table 2
gives an overview of the short term impact of changes in the exogenous variables, while
table 3 summarises the impacts with respect to the long term. In relation to the tables,
it is important to note that the values of the portfolio fraction elasticities are considered
reasonable if, for example, the value of ∂b
∂iE
iE
b
is similar compared to ∂m
∂iE
iE
m
and ∂f
∂iE
iE
f
,
etc. The values of dc and v are considered reasonable if dc ⋅ v > iB .23
External Influence on Domestic Variables
Subsequently, the impact of changes in variables which are not under the control of the
central bank (σ̂, îF , and p̂∗) are looked at, with changes in these variables being termed
external shocks.24
If an increase in domestic macroeconomic risk leads to a relative risk increase (dσ̂ >
0), the risk averse private households tend to increase their exposure to foreign assets
23The solving of the model is described in detail by a supplemental paper available on the IQSS
Dataverse http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder. Therein, the solutions are available in explicit
formulas (e. g., useful for simulating the model results). Likewise, it is proven that the short term system
and the long term system are truly dynamically stable, following the approach by Metzler (1945). See
also the review of Hands (2010) on stability tests for general equilibrium models.
24Exogenous increases in σ̂, ̂iF , and p̂∗ are discussed. The conclusions hold vice versa if decreases in
σ̂, ̂iF , and p̂∗ are considered.
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Table 2—Impact of Changes in the Exogenous Variables in the Short Term
diB/ diE/ ds/ dW / dp/
/dσ̂ ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 b = 0
/dîF ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 b = 0
/diK ⋛ 0 < 0 ⋛ 0 < 0 = 0
/dn̂BCB < 0
a > 0 a ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0
/dn̂FCB ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0
a > 0 > 0
a Given reasonable values of portfolio fraction elasticities.
b Given ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
, and respectively ∂m
∂îF
îF
m
, differ sufficiently from 0.
Table 3—Impact of Changes in the Exogenous Variables in the Long Term
diB/ diE/ ds/ dnF / dnB/ dW / dY r/ dp/
/dσ̂ ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 c < 0 > 0
/dîF ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 c < 0 > 0
/dp̂∗ = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0
/dK̂ > 0 a > 0 b > 0 b < 0 b > 0 a > 0 > 0 b > 0 b
/dn̂BCB > 0
a > 0 b > 0 b < 0 b > 0 b > 0 > 0 b > 0 b
/dn̂FCB > 0
b > 0 b > 0 b ⋛ 0 > 0 b > 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 b
a Given reasonable values of portfolio fraction elasticities, dc, and v.
b Given reasonable values of portfolio fraction elasticities.
c Given ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
, and respectively ∂m
∂îF
îF
m
, differ sufficiently from 0.
(increase in f) at the cost of domestic assets (decrease in m, b, and e). This behaviour is
based on risk-return considerations. Consequently, the initial disturbance of an increase
in σ̂ consists of an allocation effect. The increasing demand for foreign assets causes
an increase in demand for foreign currency, with the exchange rate therefore increasing
endogenously. The increase in the exchange rate induces a wealth effect, which positively
affects the demand for all asset types, and a value compensation effect, which negatively
affects the demand for foreign assets and positively affects the demand for domestic
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assets. In the short term, a new equilibrium is obtained through this increase in the
exchange rate to the extent that the initial allocation effect is entirely compensated
for by the endogenous wealth effect and the value compensation effect. No changes in
domestic interest rates emerge if the elasticity of m, with respect to σ̂, corresponds to
the respective elasticities of b and e. However, the domestic bond interest rate, as well as
the equity discount rate, may increase if b and e are, in relative terms, more negatively
affected by an increase in σ̂ than m, and vice versa. If private households consider money
as risk free (or nearly risk free)25, an increase in σ̂ has a positive impact on iB and iE ,
and a less positive impact on s, seeing as the increases in iB and iE negatively affect
the demand for foreign assets again. In sum, private households’ wealth increases in the
short term in reaction to dσ̂ > 0, given that the positive wealth effect produced by ds > 0
is not exceeded by potential negative wealth effects caused by diB > 0 and diE > 0. The
domestic price level is not affected since an increase in σ̂ neither influences the domestic
money amount nor real domestic production in the short term.
When interpreting the long term effects, it is essential to consider that the short term
increase in the exchange rate has made the consumption of foreign goods relatively more
expensive.26 Consequently, private households optimise their consumption composition,
substituting imports of foreign goods by exchanging equity assets in return for domestic
goods from the producers (see equation 41). The current account surpluses realised here
cause, on the one hand, an excess supply of foreign currency so that the exchange rate
decreases. On the other hand, they are used to acquire additional foreign assets. Over
time, the wealth effect and the value compensation effect caused by the short term increase
in the exchange rate convert for the most part into a long term wealth effect, as well as a
long term supply effect through the increase in the amount of foreign assets. However, the
exchange rate does not return to its initial value. Since the domestic stock of real capital
(nCG) decreases due to the exchange of equity assets (see equation 15)27, real domestic
production (Y r) also decreases. Thus, the domestic price level increases (see equation 25)
to the extent that in the new long term equilibrium, purchasing power parity is obtained
with a higher exchange rate than before. All in all, private households’ wealth increases
due to the positive wealth effects resulting from the increase in the amount of foreign
assets and the increase in the exchange rate. However, this is only the case if the effects
are not overcompensated for by negative wealth effects related to an increase in iB , an
associated decrease in nBP , and an increase in i
E .28
In sum, the resulting reduction in the domestic stock of real capital, in reaction to the
increase in σ̂, is a logical consequence of private households’ investment behaviour. If
25 ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
would be zero or close to zero.
26An increase in the real exchange rate (sreal) results, see equation 40.
27Furthermore, the supply of domestic bonds is negatively affected in the long term if the domestic
bond interest rate increases in the short term (if ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
is zero or close to zero). In this case, additional
domestic disinvestment takes place due to the long term decrease in nB (see equations 15 and 32).
28Overcompensation would occur if private households consider money to be risk free or nearly risk
free (see footnote 25).
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domestic investment becomes relatively riskier, risk averse investors will relocate capital
through disinvesting domestically and investing in relatively less risky projects abroad
until their investment portfolio is balanced once again.
An increase in the foreign interest rate (îF ) has a similar impact on the endogenous
variables as does an increase in σ̂. The difference is that the initial disturbance of dîF > 0
consists of a wealth effect and a value compensation effect in addition to the allocation
effect. In the short term, the exchange rate also increases, which balances out demand
and supply. Likewise, the amount of domestic real capital decreases in the long term
since foreign investment becomes relatively more attractive. However, the reason for the
reduction in the domestic stock of real capital is not based on changes in the relative risk,
but on changes in the relative return on investment projects.
An increase in the foreign price level (p̂∗) has no short term effect within the model.
However, foreign goods become relatively more expensive compared to domestic goods.
Consequently, private households adjust their consumption composition over the long
term. They exchange equity assets in return for domestic goods to allow for the sub-
stitution of foreign imports (see equation 41). A current account surplus is obtained,
causing the exchange rate to decrease. The private households thus acquire additional
foreign assets to compensate for the relative loss in the value of foreign assets.29 Overall,
the negative wealth effect connected to ds < 0 compensates for the positive wealth effect
connected to dnFP > 0, with the result being that private households’ wealth remains un-
changed. That being said, the domestic stock of real capital decreases, which also causes
real domestic production to decrease. Finally, the new long term general equilibrium is
characterised by a lower exchange rate and a higher domestic price level compared to the
initial situation.
As was the case before, the real domestic disinvestment caused by the increase in
the foreign price level is comprehensible from an investor’s perspective because it is
reasonable to shift real capital internationally if a relatively higher value added can be
realised abroad.
Central Bank’s Influence on Domestic Variables
The central bank is able to influence the endogenous variables by changing their policy
variables iK (in the short term), K̂ (in the long term), n̂BCB , and n̂
F
CB .
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If the central bank increases the credit interest rate (iK) in the short term, it reduces
the amount of domestic dividend payments (see equation 37).31 On the one hand, the
29The negative wealth effect and the value compensation effect caused by the decrease in the exchange
rate is compensated for by the positive wealth effect and the supply effect connected to the increase in
the amount of foreign assets.
30Subsequently, exogenous increases in iK , K̂, ̂nB
CB
, and ̂nF
CB
are discussed. The conclusions hold
vice versa if decreases in these variables are considered.
31Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show empirically that an unexpected 25 basis point decrease in the
federal funds rate causes an 1% increase in stock prices, and vice versa. They identify changes in (future)
dividend payments being a likely reason for these changes in stock prices, as is the case within this model.
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reduction in Div produces a negative wealth effect, causing the demand for all asset
types to decrease. On the other hand, the negative supply effect produces an excess
demand for domestic dividend payments and as a consequence, the equity discount rate
decreases endogenously. Below, the excess demand for domestic dividend payments is
primarily balanced by the resulting value compensation effect, whereas the excess supply
of the remaining asset types is balanced in particular by the related wealth and allocation
effects.32 In total, private households’ wealth is lower in the short term equilibrium than
it was in the initial situation. Finally, the demand for credit becomes elastic over the long
term33, and iK decreases to its initial value so that the long term equilibrium is equal
to the initial situation. Consequently, a sole short term increase in iK has no long term
impact on the endogenous variables.
If the central bank increases the credit amount in the long term34, it directly increases
the money supply and thus the amount of money held in private households’ portfolio (see
equation 4 and equilibrium condition 59). The increase in the money supply produces a
wealth effect and a supply effect. Since the domestic price level increases proportionally
(see equation 25), the increase in p⋅Y
r
v
produces a balancing allocation effect. When
considered on its own, it consequently follows that increases in the money supply have
a neutral effect on the endogenous variables iB , iE , s, nFP , and n
B
P , while increasing W
and p. However, increases in the money supply also increase the amount of dividend
payments (see equation 38) and the supply of domestic bonds35. The excess supply of
domestic dividend payments causes an increase in the equity discount rate. In addition,
the excess supply of domestic bonds causes the domestic bond interest rate to increase.
Furthermore, the private households optimise their consumption composition in reaction
to the increase in the domestic price level by increasing their demand for foreign imports.
Through the related increase in demand for foreign currency, the exchange rate increases
and foreign assets are sold. The exchange of domestically produced goods for equity assets
goes hand in hand with this. In sum, the increase in the amount of credit, domestic bonds,
and domestic equity assets causes an increase in the domestic stock of real capital (nCG,
see equation 15) at the cost of foreign investment (nF , see equation 44). In the new long
term equilibrium, private households are satisfied with a lower amount of foreign assets in
their portfolio for two reasons: firstly, because of the increase in domestic interest rates,
and secondly, due to the increase in the exchange rate. Furthermore, private households’
wealth increases because of the net positive wealth effects, and finally, real domestic
production increases due to the increase in nCG.
32Thereby, no changes in the domestic bond interest rate or in the exchange rate are required. The
domestic bond interest rate only decreases if the demand for domestic bonds is more positively affected
by a decrease in iE than the demand for foreign assets, and vice versa. Concerning the exchange rate,
the relationship applies analogically in the case of the demand for foreign assets.
33By assumption, the money view holds in the long term.
34A short term increase in K̂ is not feasible since in the short term, the demand for loans is inelastic
according to the credit view.
35The increase in the bond supply is definite if the reasonable proposition dc ⋅ v > iB is implied (see
equation 33).
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A purchase of domestic bonds by the central bank (dn̂BCB > 0) increases the money
supply in the short term. By again considering the partial impact, the resulting increase
in the money supply has a neutral effect on the endogenous variables iB , iE , and s,
while increasing W and p. However, through acquiring domestic bonds, the central
bank decreases the domestic bond supply vis-a`-vis the private households. Furthermore,
the increase in the money supply produces an increase in domestic dividend payments.
Consequently, the excess demand for domestic bonds is balanced by a decrease in the
domestic bond interest rate, while the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced by
an increase in the equity discount rate. Thus, short term equilibrium is characterised by
an increase in W , p and iE , and a decrease in iB , while the reaction of s is ambiguous.36
In the long term, private households optimise their consumption composition in re-
action to the increase in p. Furthermore, domestic producers increase the bond supply
due to the short term decrease in iB , and the lasting increase in the money supply (see
equation 32). Except for nB , an increase in n̂BCB has the same long term impact on the
endogenous variables as an increase in K̂.37 This result is obvious since in the long term,
producers consider bonds and loans as perfect substitutes, following the money view (see
page 11).
If the central bank acquires additional foreign assets (dn̂FCB > 0), the domestic price
level and dividend payments increase in the short term because of the increase in the
money supply. In response, the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced by an en-
dogenous increase in the equity discount rate. Furthermore, the increase in n̂FCB decreases
the short term supply of foreign assets vis-a`-vis the private households. The resulting
excess demand for foreign assets produces an excess demand for foreign currency, with the
exchange rate increasing as result. The exchange rate increases until the decrease in f ,
produced by the lower amount of foreign assets held by private households, is sufficiently
compensated for. In this case, the excess demand for foreign assets is balanced in the
short term.38
An increase in n̂FCB is similar to dK̂ > 0 and dn̂
B
CB > 0 in that it increases domestic
money supply and thereby increases the amount of dividend payments, as well as the
domestic price level. However, an increase in n̂FCB has only an ambiguous impact on the
bond interest rate in the short term. Consequently, producers’ incentive to increase the
domestic bond supply over time is lower compared to dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0. Moreover,
dn̂FCB > 0 has a positive impact on the exchange rate in the short term and thereby
increases the relative price of foreign goods. Depending on whether the impact of the
increase in the domestic price level or the increase in the exchange rate prevails, private
households decrease or increase the consumption of domestic goods over time. Overall,
36The exchange rate (s) is only positively affected by the intervention if the positive effect a decrease
in iB has on the demand for foreign assets outweighs the counteracting negative effect caused by the
increase in iE (and vice versa).
37Given an identical increase in the money amount associated with both interventions.
38There is a chance that the exchange rate may also decrease in the short term, but only if the increase
in iE has an exceptionally strong negative impact on the demand for foreign assets.
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the long term reaction of the amount of domestic equity assets and foreign assets, as well
as the amount of domestic real capital goods, is ambiguous.
In long term equilibrium, for each money unit created by dn̂FCB > 0, the increase in the
total amount of domestic bonds is lower, and the increase in the domestic bond interest
rate is higher compared to dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0. Moreover, the reaction of the domestic
stock of real capital is ambiguous, as is the reaction of real domestic production. Finally,
purchasing power parity is obtained with a higher exchange rate than in the case of
dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0.
III. Monetary Policy Interventions and Trade-Offs
A. Implementation of Monetary Policy
As demonstrated in the previous section, domestic variables can be influenced by ex-
ogenous changes in external variables (σ̂, îF , and p̂∗) that are not under the control of
the central bank. If the central bank is to maintain a certain target value, e. g., for the
exchange rate, the domestic price level, or real domestic production, this target may not
be achieved in the short term or in the long term due to external shocks. The central
bank is able to react through adjusting its policy variables with the goal of compen-
sating for external impacts. However, an intervention stabilising one variable may have
destabilising side effects on other variables. Subsequently, the trade-offs associated with
monetary policy interventions are analysed on the basis of two strategies which are ap-
plied in practice: expansive interventions in times of economic crises, and exchange rate
stabilisation.
B. Expansive Monetary Interventions
Expansive Monetary Policy during Economic Crises
Generally, economies are affected by a high level of risk in times of economic crises
(Schwert, 1989; Mishkin, 2001; Angeletos and Werning, 2006). For example, since the
start of the financial crisis in 2007, the financial markets of various advanced economies
experienced massive distortions. Due to the burst of the US housing bubble and the
collapse of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers, a high amount of systemic risk has
become prevalent. Concerning the model used in this paper, it is possible to trace the
substantial decline in the British Pound (starting in September 2007) back to the increase
in Britain’s relative macroeconomic risk (σ̂) caused by the bank run on Northern Rock.
Taking Europe and the United States into account, the decline in equity indices and the
pressure on bond markets, which followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, would imply
that money was less affected by the increase in macroeconomic risk when compared to
bonds and equity assets. In sum, it is highly probable that negative wealth effects have
prevailed, decreasing the wealth of European and US households.
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Central banks have often reacted to financial and economic distortions by relaxing
banking restrictions and using expansive monetary policy.39 Over the course of the recent
financial crisis, central banks reduced interest rates, expanded the credit supply and,
especially as interest rates approached the zero lower bound, carried out open market
purchases of domestic assets. The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England in
particular expanded their balance sheets through acquiring a variety of domestic debt
securities, mainly in the form of long term government bonds, but also commercial papers
and mortgage-backed securities (Klyuev et al., 2009). These interventions are also referred
to as ‘quantitative easing’ (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Bernanke et al., 2004).40
The Impact of Expansive Monetary Interventions
In terms of the presented model, expansive monetary interventions are open market
purchases of domestic bonds and increases in the credit supply. Subsequently, the paper
analyses the extent to which these interventions and the connected liquidity provision
help to mitigate the impact of an increase in domestic macroeconomic risk (σ̂). Without
central bank intervention, the model implies that an increase in σ̂ may be associated
with a decrease in private households’ wealth in the short term.41 In the long term, a
reduction in the domestic stock of real capital takes place, causing a decrease in real
domestic production.
In the short term, the impact of an open market purchase of domestic bonds is differ-
ent compared to that of an expansion in credit lending. Through a purchase of domestic
bonds, the central bank decreases the domestic bond supply vis-a`-vis the private house-
holds, thereby taking on a part of the increased domestic risk on its balance sheet. As
a consequence, there is less domestic risk in the market, causing a decline in risk premi-
ums, i. e., a decrease in iB , and an increase in domestic bond prices.42 Furthermore, the
increase in liquidity produces an increase in dividend payments. Equity prices increase
on the one hand, while the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced again by an
increase in iE on the other. Since diB < 0 positively affects the demand for foreign assets,
and diE > 0 has a negative impact, the exchange rate is not necessarily affected in the
short term. Finally, the negative wealth effects connected to the decrease in nBP and the
increase in iE , are outweighed by the positive wealth effects associated with the decrease
in iB , the increase in Div, and the increase in M . Consequently, possible negative wealth
effects caused by dσ̂ > 0 can be compensated for in the short term through an increase
in n̂BCB . However, this is only possible at the cost of an increase in the domestic price
39See, for example, Minsky (1986) and Neely (2003), who discuss the reaction of the US Federal
Reserve to several crises.
40See also the discussion on the term ‘quantitative easing’ in Klyuev et al. (2009).
41This is the case if private households consider money to be risk free or nearly risk free (see footnote
25).
42Borio and Zhu (2008) refer to this as the ‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary policy, which was seen as
important during the recent central bank interventions (Klyuev et al., 2009). For example, the negative
impact of recent open market purchases on bond interest rates is illustrated by Gagnon et al. (2011) in
the case of the US and by Joyce et al. (2011) in the case of Britain.
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level, which is produced by the expansion of the money supply (see equations 25 and 6).
Furthermore, domestic interest rates and asset prices are distorted, no longer reflecting
the changes in the external economic conditions.
Due to the implications of the money view, the central bank is not able to increase the
amount of credit in the short term. However, if it tends to increase credit lending in the
long term, it needs to reduce the credit interest rate in the short term in order to offer
incentives for additional borrowing. Through a decrease in the credit interest rate, the
amount of dividend payments increases (see equation 37). Consequently, equity prices
and the equity discount rate increase, while the bond interest rate and the exchange
rate are not necessarily affected. Compared to a purchase of bonds, the wealth effect is
less pronounced since no substantial decrease in the domestic bond interest rate is to be
expected in the short term.
However, the long term implications of an open market purchase of domestic bonds
and an increase in the credit amount are the same. Due to the decrease in either the bond
or credit interest rate, as well as the increase in dividend payments, both the domestic
bond supply and the demand for credit increase in the long term, in accordance with the
static trade-off theory and the credit view (see equation 32). By increasing the amount
of credit, the central bank takes on domestic risk on its balance sheet. In addition, the
money supply increases, causing an increase in the domestic price level.
Consequently, both types of expansive monetary interventions increase the debt lia-
bilities of producers, resulting in an increase in the domestic stock of real capital goods
(see equation 15). The domestic bond interest rate increases in reaction to the resulting
excess supply of domestic bonds, eventually causing bond and credit interest rates to ex-
ceed the initial value which existed before the expansive monetary interventions (see table
3). Through private households’ adjustment in consumption behaviour, both a current
account deficit and an increase in the exchange rate occur. Furthermore, an additional
increase in the domestic stock of real capital follows, witnessed through the increasing
amount of domestic equity assets. The final result is that the imminent decline in the
domestic stock of real capital caused by dσ̂ > 0 can be averted in the long term through
expansive monetary interventions.
The Trade-Offs of Expansive Monetary Interventions
Through an open market purchase of domestic bonds or an increase in the credit
supply, central banks are able to avert two crucial consequences of an increase in domestic
macroeconomic risk. First, a negative wealth effect caused by a decline in bond and equity
indices can be alleviated in the short term, primarily through open market purchases of
domestic bonds. Second, impending real domestic disinvestment can be avoided since
expansive monetary interventions produce an increase in the domestic stock of real capital
(attributed to increases in the amount of debt and equity assets). The long term impacts
of both types of expansive monetary interventions are theoretically the same. However,
open market purchases of domestic bonds may be more effective in practice if the short
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term possibilities to decrease credit interest rates are limited to near the zero lower
bound. The reason for this is that a higher amount of credit will only be swiftly accepted
by producers if borrowing becomes noticeably more attractive in the short term through
a substantial decrease in the credit interest rate, which may be close to impossible near
the zero lower bound.
However, side effects arise which lead one to question whether aggregate welfare is
positively affected overall by expansive monetary interventions. For example, the price
level of domestic goods rises due to the increase in the money supply. The welfare impact
of increases in the price level is generally considered to be negative in the literature,
particularly if they are persistent (Lucas, 2000; Lagos and Rocheteau, 2005; Burstein and
Hellwig, 2008). In addition, the increase in the domestic price level is the underlying
reason for a long term devaluation of the domestic currency. Consequently, additional
exchange rate volatility occurs, which may cause increasing costs of currency hedging.
Fluctuations in the interest rates on debt capital may also bear long term risks for (highly)
indebted institutions. If, for example, the government considers the short term decrease in
bond interest rates after an open market purchase to be persistent, subsequently financing
investment and social projects with a relatively low return through the issue of bonds,
they may run into problems with a long term increase in bond interest rates. More
precisely, it is possible that the liquidity of indebted institutions will become severely
endangered from a long term perspective, given low budgetary foresight. Regarding
the central bank, it takes on domestic risk on its balance sheet by purchasing domestic
bonds and expanding the credit amount. Since the central bank can be considered as a
crucial institution within a state, it may itself become a source of macroeconomic risk.
However, to date it is unclear what level of intervention can lead to an inadequately
diversified cluster of domestic risk on its balance sheet. Finally, expansive monetary
interventions cause an inefficient international allocation of real capital. If domestic
macroeconomic risk increases, domestic investment becomes less attractive compared to
foreign investment. Consequently, it would be suitable to reduce the amount of domestic
investment. If the central bank takes on the increase in domestic risk through expansive
monetary interventions, it stabilises the domestic stock of real capital at the cost of foreign
investment.
In a nutshell, the impact of expansive monetary interventions on domestic welfare is
ambiguous in times of economic crises. A definite assessment of their impact is only
possible on a case-by-case basis. However, it is reasonable to conclude that world welfare
is negatively affected due to the resulting inefficient international allocation of real capital.
C. Exchange Rate Stabilisation
General Remarks
It is commonly observed that many countries do not float their currencies, intervening
in order to stabilise the exchange rate. The extent to which a country stabilises its
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currency in relation to foreign currencies is defined by its exchange rate regime. Even
though there is much debate about how exchange rate regimes of countries should be
classified (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005), it is clear
that exchange rate stabilisation continues to this day (Levy Yeyati et al., 2010). A recent
example is Switzerland. To interrupt the continuous appreciation of the Swiss Franc, the
Swiss National Bank decided to enforce a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Swiss Franc per
Euro “with the utmost determination” starting from the 6th of September 2011 (Swiss
National Bank, 2011).
An advantage of stabilised exchange rates is the lower transaction costs in regards to
currency hedging. Consequently, low exchange rate volatility tends to foster international
trade (Ozturk, 2006). Through enforcing a certain exchange rate target, the central bank
is also able to influence the competitiveness of domestic producers on international mar-
kets (Rodrik, 2008). On the other hand, the central bank has to maintain the exchange
rate target, thereby losing monetary policy autonomy (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld et al.,
2005). Despite this, a new dimension in the discussion regarding exchange rate regimes
emerges within the current model. The following shows that exchange rate stabilisation
can be related to the stabilisation of the domestic stock of real capital.
The Impact of Exchange Rate Stabilisation
In the short term, the exchange rate increases (ds > 0) if there is a relative increase in
domestic macroeconomic risk (dσ̂ > 0) or through an increase in the foreign interest rate
(dîF > 0). The reason for this is that domestic private households tend to hold a higher
proportion of foreign assets in their portfolio, therefore demanding foreign currency to
allow for the purchase of foreign assets. To avoid a short term increase in the exchange
rate, the central bank has to avert these foreign asset purchases through the capital
account. This is possible by satisfying demand, i. e., supplying their own stocks of foreign
assets (dn̂FCB < 0). However, with dn̂
F
CB < 0, the domestic amount of money (M) would
be negatively affected. The domestic price level (p), the amount of dividend payments
(Div), and the equity discount rate (iE) would decrease as a consequence (see equations
4, 25 and 37, and table 2). Furthermore, a decrease in the domestic price level would
produce an appreciation of the domestic currency since purchasing power parity holds in
the long term. To avoid these side effects, the central bank needs to purchase domestic
bonds. Through a so called sterilised intervention, the impact on the money supply is
completely neutralised.43 However, through the purchase of domestic bonds, the central
bank negatively affects the domestic bond interest rate. The result here is that the impact
on the domestic money amount cannot be neutralised by the central bank without also
having a short term influence on the domestic bond interest rate.
43This is the case if dM < 0, caused by d̂nF
CB
< 0, corresponds to dM > 0, caused by d̂nB
CB
> 0.
Therefore, it must hold that d̂nF
CB
⋅ s ⋅
qF
îF
+ d̂nB
CB
⋅
qB
iB
= 0.
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In the long term, the amount of domestic real capital would decrease following a relative
increase in domestic macroeconomic risk (dσ̂ > 0) or an increase in the foreign interest
rate (dîF > 0). The reason for this is that private households adjust their consumption
composition due to the short term increase in the exchange rate, whereby the amount of
domestic equity assets is reduced (see equation 41). The domestic stock of real capital
(nCG) therefore decreases (see equation 15). If the central bank averts the short term
increase in the exchange rate without affecting the money supply, no incentive remains
to reduce the domestic stock of real capital with the amount of equity assets. Only minor
changes in nCG may result in the long term due to decreases or increases in the amount
of domestic bonds.44
In the long term, changes in the foreign price level (p̂∗) have an impact on the exchange
rate (s) as well. If the foreign price level increases, domestic private households adjust
their consumption composition according to the real exchange rate (see equation 41).
They substitute the relatively expensive foreign imports for domestic goods, thereby
reducing the amount of equity assets and the domestic stock of real capital. The resulting
surplus on the current account produces a decrease in s. The central bank is able to
avert an appreciation of the domestic currency by increasing the domestic price level (p)
through reflationary monetary interventions, such as K̂ > 0, n̂BCB > 0, or n̂
F
CB > 0.
By increasing p through K̂ > 0 or n̂BCB > 0, no incentive remains for private households
to adjust their consumption composition. Consequently, the amount of domestic real
capital goods (nCG) is sustained since the number of equity assets does not change. The
result is that nCG even increases overall due to the positive reaction of the supply of
domestic bonds. An increase in n̂FCB , on the contrary, has an ambiguous impact on n
CG.
Therefore, a combination of K̂ > 0 or n̂BCB > 0 with n̂
F
CB > 0 can stabilise both n
CG and
the exchange rate. In addition, such combined interventions avert risk clusters on the
central bank’s balance sheet.
The Trade-Offs of Exchange Rate Stabilisation
In sum, sterilised interventions are required to avert exchange rate deviations, which
are caused by changes in σ̂ and îF . The domestic money supply needs to be adjusted
to sustainably neutralise exchange rate deviations caused by changes in p̂∗. Both types
44 If iB increases following the external shock, and this increase is higher than the decrease following
central bank intervention, the supply of domestic bonds decreases in the long term. Consequently, real
domestic disinvestment takes place (nCG < 0), real domestic production decreases and the domestic
price level increases. The increase in the domestic price level would positively affect the exchange rate
since purchasing power parity holds in the long term. Hence, this impact on the exchange rate can
be neutralised by adequately decreasing the domestic money amount to the extent that the domestic
price level remains constant in the long term. This can be realised by decreasing the credit amount
(K̂) or the central bank’s amount of domestic bonds (̂nB
CB
). However, the decrease in nCG cannot be
totally averted. From the opposite perspective, if an increase in iB is lower than the decrease following
the central bank interventions or iB remains constant/decreases in reaction to the external shock, the
central bank has to sufficiently increase the domestic money supply over time in order to stabilise the
exchange rate in the long term. Still, an increase in nCG would remain.
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of intervention not only stabilise the exchange rate, but can also avert changes in the
domestic stock of real capital, which would otherwise be caused by external shocks.45
Nonetheless, both types of intervention are associated with trade-offs possibly affecting
aggregate welfare.
Sterilised interventions represent asset swaps by the central bank. As a precondition for
sterilised interventions, it is necessary for the central bank to possess a sufficient amount
of domestic bonds or foreign assets so that the necessary transaction amount can be
carried out. By selling foreign assets and buying domestic bonds to avoid a devaluation
of the domestic currency, the central bank accumulates domestic risk on its balance sheet.
Consequently, the central bank may itself become a source of macroeconomic risk if it
builds up an inadequate cluster of domestic risks.46 By taking over domestic risk, the
central bank reduces the risk premium on domestic assets relative to foreign assets. The
result here is the stabilisation of the amount of domestic equity assets, as well as lowering
the interest rate on domestic bonds, promoting an increase in bond supply. The domestic
stock of real capital is stabilised or even increased if the amount of domestic assets
increases overall. As a consequence, these sterilised interventions cause an inefficient
international allocation of real capital. If σ̂ or îF increase, domestic investment becomes
less attractive compared to foreign investment. If the central bank takes on domestic
risk through sterilised interventions, it averts adjustments in the domestic stock of real
capital at the cost of foreign investment.
Reflationary monetary interventions avert exchange rate changes caused by increases
in the foreign price level (p̂∗). However, this comes at a cost, i. e., increases in the domes-
tic price level (p). In addition, these non-sterilised interventions may hinder adequate
adjustments in the amount of real capital goods. If the price level of foreign goods
increases, foreign investments produce a higher value added than before, therefore be-
coming relatively more attractive than domestic investments. As a consequence, domestic
disinvestment and foreign investment take place. Reflationary interventions that focus
on domestic markets (K̂ > 0, n̂BCB > 0) avert domestic disinvestment and even increase
the domestic stock of real capital, both at the cost of foreign investment. Reflationary
interventions that focus on the foreign asset market (n̂BCB > 0) cannot, on average, avert
domestic disinvestment. However, non-sterilised interventions that focus on either do-
mestic or foreign markets would again produce risk clusters on the central bank’s balance
sheet. Through a combination of both types of non-sterilised interventions, the central
bank firstly avoids risk clusters and secondly prevents changes in the domestic stock of
real capital.47
45Only minor changes in nCG may be expected because of changes in the domestic bond supply.
46By purchasing foreign assets and selling domestic bonds to avert an appreciation of the domestic
currency, the central bank is, from the opposite perspective, in danger of accumulating an inadequate
cluster of foreign risk on its balance sheet.
47Through restrictive monetary interventions, the relationships here hold the other way round if the
central bank averts a devaluation of the domestic currency due to a decrease in the foreign price level.
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To summarise, it is unclear whether exchange rate stabilisation has a positive impact
on domestic welfare. The stabilisation of the exchange rate and the real amount of do-
mestic investment goes hand in hand with either increasing risk clusters on the central
bank’s balance sheet or with changes in the domestic price level. Nevertheless, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that world welfare is negatively affected because a resulting inefficient
international allocation of real capital is to be expected.
D. Empirical Estimation of Exchange Rate Stabilising Interventions
Method and Data
In this section, the exchange rate stabilising interventions of the central banks of three
European countries – Austria, Belgium, and Denmark – are analysed. For each country,
an impulse response analysis is performed based on an unrestricted vector autoregressive
(VAR) estimation. By using this approach, it is possible to simulate short term devia-
tions of the respective exchange rates and to draw conclusions from the reactions of the
remaining variables in regards to exchange rate stabilising interventions.
The VAR estimation is based on monthly financial data. For Austria and Belgium,
the time period before the Euro introduction is considered, in which the German Mark
served as the base currency. For Denmark, it is the time period after the Euro introduc-
tion, in which the Euro represents the base currency for the Danish Crone.48 Each of
the three VARs is estimated with time series of eight stationary variables. These reflect
the exchange rate in levels (s), governmental bond clean price indices (bonds), the MSCI
share market indices (msci), central banks’ amount of currency reserves (reserv), the
three month interbank interest rates (iK3m), the monetary aggregates M1 (M1), M3
less M1 (M3−M1), and the consumer price indices (inf). The variable bonds represents
the growth rate of the domestic bond index, minus the growth rate of the base country
bond index in order to exclude common trends, especially those caused by the business
cycle. The same is true for msci, reserv, M1, M3 −M1, and inf . Concerning iK3m, it
represents the difference between the three month interbank interest rates for the same
reason. A constant term, seasonal dummies, and dummies concerning the German mon-
etary union in 1990 are included as exogenous variables.49 Subsequently, the exchange
rate is shocked by one standard deviation and the accumulated responses are determined
for a period of 18 months within the impulse response estimation.
48See plots of the exchange rates in figure A.2 of the appendix.
49See an overview of the VAR estimation settings and respective test statistics in tables A.3 and A.4
of the appendix. The time series are from Datastream and the central banks. The respective EViews
workfiles and a detailed description of the data sources, which contains Datastream mnemonics and links
to internet resources of central bank time series, are available for download from the IQSS Dataverse
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder.
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The Impulse Response against the Background of the Model
To choose a consistent ordering in the Choleski decomposition and to interpret the
output of the impulse response estimation, one needs to consider the theoretical reasons
for the initial exchange rate deviation. This is crucial since one would expect sterilised
interventions if the deviation is based on current changes in σ̂ or îF . If it is caused by
preceding changes in relative good prices ( p
p̂∗
), non-sterilised interventions would be the
likely result. By solely shocking s within the impulse response estimation, it is implied
that the change in s is not caused by a contemporaneous change in îF .50
Consequently, the initial increase in the exchange rate within the impulse response
estimation may be theoretically caused by either a contemporaneous increase in σ̂ or a
preceding increase in p
p̂∗
. Changes in σ̂ may also have a contemporaneous impact on
bond and equity markets (bonds and msci) because it may affect iB and iE (see table
2). The variables iK3m, reserv, M1, M3−M1, and inf are, in contrast, predominantly
determined by the central bank in the short term. It is reasonable to assume that changes
in these variables only occur with a one-period lag because the central bank requires time
to react to changing circumstances. In the following, the applied ordering in the Choleski
decomposition iK3m, reserv, M1, M3 −M1, inf , s, bonds, msci consistently reflects
these relationships.51
Following this, one would expect changes in variables indicating sterilised interventions
if an increase in σ̂ is the reason for exchange rate changes. If a preceding increase in p
p̂∗
is the reason, one would expect non-sterilised interventions in turn.
Results and Interpretation
Figures 2 to 4 show the respective responses to a one standard deviation exchange rate
shock for Austria, Belgium, and Denmark.52 Only Austria and Denmark seem to clearly
sell currency reserves in reaction to a sudden devaluation of their currencies (decrease
50Changes in ̂iF must be associated with changes in bonds and msci. An increase in ̂iF would be
followed by a relative decrease in foreign asset prices. Consequently, the bond and stock indices of the
foreign base country would decrease relative to the indices of the domestic country whereby bonds and
msci would increase. If one only shocks the exchange rate within the impulse response estimation without
shocking bonds and msci at the same time, the implication is that the exchange rate shock is not caused
by a change in ̂iF . Therefore, only current changes in σ̂ or preceding changes in p
p̂∗
would explain the
current exchange rate deviation.
51Variation in the suborder of iK3m, reserv, M1, M3 −M1, inf or bonds, msci has nearly no effect
on impulse response estimation results. Variation with reference to the order of s would no longer
be consistent with the model relationships anymore. For example, an order of s, iK3m, reserv, M1,
M3 −M1, inf , bonds, msci would imply infinitely fast responses by the central bank. With an order of
iK3m, reserv, M1, M3−M1, inf , bonds, msci, s, the impact of changes in σ̂ on iB and iE would fall by
the wayside. However, even choosing a ‘wrong’ ordering has only minor influence because the correlations
of residuals are generally low. See EViews workfiles from http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder to
reproduce results.
52For each impulse response estimation holds: accumulated responses, 18 periods, Monte Carlo sim-
ulated response standard errors (100000 repetitions), Cholesky type: dof adjusted, see last section and
footnote 51 for Cholesky order. The responses of M3 −M1 and inf can be found in figure A.3 of the
appendix.
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Figure 2. : Austria
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Responses to a one standard deviation exchange rate shock (± 2 error stdv).
in reserv). However, iK3m increases in Austria and Belgium, indicating a relatively
more restrictive credit supply.53 For each country, the domestic bond index loses value
compared to the base country (decrease in bonds), indicating a relative increase in the
domestic bond interest rate. This increase might be caused by a sale of domestic bonds
by the respective central banks or perhaps by an increase in the domestic bond supply in
reaction to the more restrictive credit supply. Furthermore, the relative changes in the
domestic share indices have a negative trend (decrease in msci); this becomes especially
clear in the case of Belgium and Denmark.
In a nutshell, the results imply that the central banks predominantly carry out non-
sterilised interventions to stabilise the exchange rate.54 Consequently, preceding changes
in p
p̂∗
are most likely the prevalent reason for exchange rate changes in Austria, Belgium,
and Denmark. This result is reasonable since these economies have similar economic
structures to their base countries (Helg et al., 1995). Therefore, it seems unlikely that
a divergent development in domestic and base country macroeconomic risk has occurred
during the considered time periods.
53Furthermore, in Belgium M3 −M1 reacts positively (see figure A.3). This may indicate that com-
mercial banks substitute increasingly expensive central bank loans through the acquisition of additional
savings deposits.
54Through sterilised central bank interventions, the domestic bond interest rate would decrease. This
would cause a relative increase in the prices of domestic bonds compared to foreign bonds, thus bonds
would increase. However, in all of the countries analysed bonds does not increase following the initial
exchange rate shock. Consequently, sterilised central bank interventions do not seem to be regularly
applied in practice.
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Figure 3. : Belgium
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Figure 4. : Denmark
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Nevertheless, differences in stabilising strategies can be observed, which have an impact
on the effectiveness of interventions. Austria seems to be the only country whose central
bank uses currency reserves and credit supply adjustments to avert exchange rate devia-
tions. The coefficient of variation of its exchange rate is the lowest of the three countries
at 0.03%. Second is Denmark with 0.16%, which seems to predominantly use adjust-
ments in currency reserves. Belgium has the highest coefficient at 0.90%55 and seems
to mainly adjust credit supply in order to stabilise the exchange rate. Besides possible
differences in the level of interventions, one explanation for the relative high coefficient
of variation compared to Austria and Denmark may be that interventions in the foreign
asset market are more effective as they have a short term impact on the exchange rate.
In contrast, adjustments in the credit supply are more effective in the long term, thus
allowing for more short term variation. However, the increase in bonds andM1 beginning
four months after the initial exchange rate shock may be due to a purchase of domestic
bonds by the Belgian central bank. Consequently, it seems that it does not completely
maintain restrictive policy measures, allowing for a higher variation in the exchange rate
than the other central banks.
IV. Remarks on General Validity
Even though the model results become more reliable through the endogenisation of the
domestic asset supply, many simplifications remain. However, these simplifications are
not expected to be of importance qualitatively, quite possibly only affecting the model
results quantitatively.
For instance, it is clear that the banking sector also includes commercial banks. Within
the model, an increase in K̂ represents an increase in credit lending by the central bank
to the producers. In general, however, the central bank provides the financial means for
the commercial banks to increase the credit supply. Thus, an increase in K̂ can also
be interpreted as an indirect increase in credit lending. It is obvious that regardless of
whether the central bank indirectly supplies the commercial banks with more financial
means to increase the credit supply or does this directly through increased credit loans for
the producers, the amount of credit available to the producers increases.56 Consequently,
an explicit consideration of the commercial banks does not influence the direction of
the model results. It would only increase the complexity without having a qualitative
impact. Nevertheless, the quantitative difference of indirect and direct lending, e. g.,
caused by commercial banks’ asset allocation behaviour, could be estimated through
the consideration of the commercial banks. For future research, it would certainly be
valuable to assess which channel is more advantageous from an efficiency point of view,
given various external conditions.
55Still, this could be considered small when compared to the USD/DEM coefficient of variation which
is 7.59% during the same time period.
56The context is illustrated in figure A.1 of the appendix.
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The context is similar in the case of the producers, which could be split between
government and private companies. Qualitatively, it is not relevant whether bonds are
issued or credit is borrowed, by the government or private companies. In both cases,
the financial means of the producers used for investment are enhanced.57 By splitting
producers between government and private companies, one could estimate whether public
or private investment is more efficient given certain external conditions. For example,
Friedman (1978) assesses this issue and discusses both crowding out and in effects under
different conditions within a portfolio balance framework. However, more research within
these contexts still needs to be carried out.
In addition, expectations may not always be static in practice (Frankel and Froot,
1987). Working under the assumption of rational expectations would only increase the
complexity of the model, merely reducing the extent, but not the direction, of the short
term reactions of the endogenous variables. Long term results would not be influenced
at all. Moreover, the assumption of a constant velocity of money is unrealistic, seeing
as it has been commonly observed that changes in the money supply mainly affect the
domestic price level in the long term (Christiano et al., 1996; Serletis and Koustas, 1998;
Bullard, 1999). Consequently, one would expect that the velocity of money decreases
after a monetary expansion, subsequently increasing and reflecting its original range. As
a result, increases in the amount of dividend payments would only be effectively realised
in the long term. By assuming rational expectations, these relationships would again be
qualitatively identical to those of the current model. Domestic private households would
expect the future increase in dividend cash flow today, and equity prices would increase
instantly due to the discounted cash flow approach. The value of equity would therefore
exceed the optimal portfolio composition, and the demand for dividend payments would
decrease in the short term, as is the case in the current model.
Furthermore, it is implied that domestic private households consume all of their in-
come. They may invest either domestically or abroad, but domestic investment always
corresponds to foreign disinvestment, and vice versa (see equation 44). Thus, the impli-
cation here is that aggregate savings are assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity.
However, while it continues to be difficult to comprehend which variables generally de-
termine the amount of savings (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), it would be expected that the
decision of where to invest savings is determined by the same procedures as the invest-
ment/disinvestment decision within the current model. Taking savings into consideration,
only the aggregate amount of real investment would be affected, but not the decision re-
garding real capital allocation. Therefore, no qualitative impact on the model results is
expected from allowing savings to be different from zero. Nevertheless, for future research
it would certainly be valuable to determine how changes in savings behaviour may affect
both interest rates and the exchange rate.
57It is expected that the government would use their increased financial means for investment in social
insurance activities or in public good related industries, like the provision of infrastructure, civil service,
or security. Private companies would, accordingly, focus on industries related to the production of private
goods.
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Moreover, additional portfolio assets such as savings deposits, real estate, or commodi-
ties are present in reality. Domestic producers also use labour as a factor of production,
and domestic private households generate income through wages. Furthermore, private
households’ assessment of macroeconomic risk may be driven by psychological factors.
Even though it could certainly be enriching to estimate how central bank interventions
may affect real estate prices, relative factor prices, or investors’ level of confidence, it is
unlikely that the introduction of such model extensions would distort or radically change
the present model results.
However, the potential relationship between risk clusters on the central bank’s balance
sheet and domestic macroeconomic risk has yet to be researched. It is possible that the
central bank itself could become a source of macroeconomic risk if it builds up extensive
risk clusters, thereby diminishing the impact of additional interventions. Furthermore,
by extending the model to include foreign actors or transaction costs, it is possible that
expansive or exchange rate stabilising interventions will not promote an inefficient al-
location of real capital in certain situations. If, for instance, changes in the relative
attractiveness of domestic investment are due to monetary interventions by the foreign
central bank, expansive monetary interventions by the domestic central bank may avert
misallocation of real capital. Stabilisation of the exchange rate may even have a positive
impact on aggregate welfare if real investment procedures are connected to transaction
costs, and the relative macroeconomic risk (σ̂) follows a mean reverting process. In such a
case, exchange rate stabilising interventions would avoid the transaction costs connected
to real investment procedures caused by stochastic changes in σ̂. This would be achieved
by sustaining the corresponding mean reverting level of the domestic stock of real capital.
V. Conclusion
The presented model expands upon the existing portfolio balance framework through
consideration of an endogenous asset supply. Furthermore, it accounts for all balance re-
strictions concerning the economic actors analysed and the balance of payments. Domes-
tic private households optimise their portfolio composition following Markowitz’s portfolio
selection and maximise real consumption with respect to the law of one price. Domes-
tic producers optimise their capital structure following the static trade-off theory and
show arbitrage behaviour in the choice of debt capital. Within the model, it becomes
clear how asset prices, the exchange rate, and the international allocation of real capital
are affected by external variables and monetary policy interventions. Subsequently, the
model results are applied by analysing expansive monetary interventions and exchange
rate stabilisation interventions in detail.
Expansive monetary interventions may avert real domestic disinvestment, which is
caused by a relative increase in domestic macroeconomic risk in times of economic crisis.
However, they also give rise to risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet, distortions
of domestic interest rates and asset prices, increases in the domestic price level, and
domestic currency devaluation. Even though the impact of open market purchases of
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domestic bonds and the expansion of credit lending are identical in the long term, bond
purchases are expected to be more effective in reducing negative impacts on private
households’ wealth and more effective at the zero lower bound of interest rates.
Concerning exchange rate stabilising interventions, it is essential to utilise the ap-
propriate intervention strategy with respect to the underlying reason for the exchange
rate fluctuation. Sterilised interventions are necessary to neutralise exchange rate devi-
ations caused by changes in relative macroeconomic risk and the foreign interest rate.
Non-sterilised interventions are essential for averting exchange rate deviations caused by
changes in the relative price level. However, sterilised interventions promote risk clusters
on the central bank’s balance sheet, whereas non-sterilised interventions are primarily
associated with changes in the domestic price level. Additionally, both types of interven-
tion do not only stabilise the exchange rate, but can also stabilise the domestic stock of
real capital. One can therefore trace why the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime
may be linked to real domestic adjustments (Eichengreen et al., 1995). Implementing the
wrong intervention strategy may avert exchange rate deviations in the short term; in the
long term, however, errors in strategy may be the reason why stabilising interventions
are sometimes unsuccessful (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Dominguez, 2006). In the cases
of Austria, Belgium, and Denmark, the paper has empirically shown through VAR im-
pulse response estimations that non-sterilised interventions were predominantly carried
out. This is plausible for these countries if exchange rate deviations can be attributed to
changes in relative good prices.
One of the most important findings of this paper is that central bank interventions
may promote an inefficient international allocation of real capital. If external variables
change, the relative advantage of domestic investment is altered, and correspondingly, ad-
justments in the stocks of domestic and foreign real capital become appropriate. Through
expansive monetary interventions and exchange rate stabilisation, the central bank can
prevent these adequate adjustments from occurring, resulting in an inefficient interna-
tional allocation of real capital. Overall, this has negative implications for world welfare.
From this point forward, more research is needed to analyse the impact of the central
bank’s asset structure on domestic macroeconomic risk. Moreover, the central bank’s
influence on real capital allocation could even be positive in certain situations, especially
if the presence of foreign actors or transaction costs is taken into consideration.
In general, monetary policy is associated with trade-offs, both domestically and inter-
nationally. Therefore, it is advisable to thoroughly evaluate the welfare impact of central
bank interventions through a holistic and internationally coordinated political process.
This, in turn, allows for potentially diverse domestic and foreign interests to be equally
taken into account.
A supplemental paper referring in detail to the solving of the model and the test for stability, as well
as the respective EViews workfiles regarding the VAR estimations, is available for download at the IQSS
Dataverse http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder.
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Appendix
Tables
Table A.1—Exogenous and Constant Variables
variable meaning
a total factor productivity (constant)
σ̂ relative macroeconomic risk (exogenous)
qB coupon payment on one domestic bond (constant)
qF coupon payment on one foreign asset in foreign currency (constant)
îF interest rate on foreign assets (exogenous)
dc fraction of producers’ income spent on debt capital costs (constant)
K̂ credit amount (exogenous)
M initial amount of domestic money (constant)
n̂BCB amount of central bank’s domestic bonds (exogenous)
nF initial amount of foreign bonds held domestically (constant)
n̂FCB amount of central bank’s foreign bonds (exogenous)
p̂∗ price level of foreign goods in foreign currency (exogenous)
v velocity of money (constant)
Table A.2—Endogenous Variables
variable meaning
b fraction of private households’ portfolio held in domestic bonds
B total value of domestic bonds
BCB value of central bank’s domestic bonds
BP value of private households’ domestic bonds
BdP private households’ demand for domestic bond value
CD private households’ consumption of domestic goods
CF private households’ consumption of foreign goods
CG value of domestic capital goods
div dividend payment on one domestic equity asset
Div aggregate dividend payments
Divd demand for aggregate dividend payments
e fraction of private households’ portfolio held in domestic equity
E total value of domestic equity
Ed private households’ demand for domestic equity value
f fraction of private households’ portfolio held in foreign bonds
F value of foreign bonds held domestically in foreign currency
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variable meaning
FCB value of central bank’s foreign bonds in foreign currency
FP value of private households’ foreign bonds in foreign currency
F dP private households’ demand for foreign bond value in foreign currency
iB interest rate on domestic bonds
iE interest rate/required rate of return on domestic equity
iK credit interest rate
IncP private households’ income
Kd producers’ demand for credit
m fraction of private households’ portfolio held in money
M amount of money
Md money demand
Ms money supply
nB total amount of domestic bonds
(nB)s total supply of domestic bond quantities
nBP amount of private households’ domestic bonds
(nBP )
d private households’ demand for domestic bond quantities
(nBP )
s supply of domestic bond quantities vis-a`-vis the private households
nCG domestic stock of real capital goods
nE total amount of domestic equity assets
nF total amount of foreign assets held domestically
nFP amount of private households’ foreign assets
(nFP )
d private households’ demand for foreign asset quantities
(nFP )
s supply of foreign bond quantities vis-a`-vis the private households
NetA central bank’s net assets
p price level of domestic goods
pB price of one domestic bond
pE price of one domestic equity asset
pF price of one foreign bond in foreign currency
s exchange rate in direct quotation
sreal real exchange rate
valCG implicit value of one capital good
W private households’ aggregate wealth
Y nominal domestic production
Y r real domestic production
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Table A.3—VAR Model Estimation Settings
Austria Belgium Denmark
time period start 1989M06 1989M10 1999M02
end 1998M12 1998M12 2011M03
lags 3 5 6
sample period start 1989M09 1990M03 1999M08
end 1998M12 1998M12 2011M03
incl. observations (after adj.) 112 106 140
edogenous variables 8 8 8
exogenous variables 14 14 12
constant 1 1 1
seasonal dummies 11 11 11
impulse dummy 1990M06 a 1 1 -
shift dummy 1990M06 a 1 1 -
total variables 38 54 60
degrees of freedom 74 52 80
a Dummies due to German monetary union.
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Table A.4—Test Statistics of VAR Model Estimations
Austria Belgium Denmark
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
(H0: no serial correlation at lag order h)
Lags Probability
1 0.342 0.146 0.781
2 0.223 0.428 0.352
3 0.623 0.285 0.688
4 0.598 0.891 0.567
5 0.473 0.310 0.009
6 0.463 0.132 0.029
7 0.826 0.805 0.115
8 0.508 0.207 0.657
9 0.858 0.434 0.975
10 0.379 0.624 0.400
11 0.672 0.760 0.293
12 0.335 0.282 0.650
13 0.594 0.963 0.959
14 0.729 0.784 0.590
15 0.589 0.354 0.576
16 0.337 0.452 0.900
17 0.900 0.682 0.232
18 0.858 0.591 0.652
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Test
(H0: no heteroskedasticity)
Probability
Joint test 0.802 0.737 0.137
No Root outside the Unit Circle
(Stability Condition)
yes yes yes
53
Figures
Figure A.1. : Increases in Credit Lending
Indirect
central bank
commercial banks
producers
Direct
central bank
commercial banks
producers
No qualitative difference between an indirect or direct increase in credit lending is present,
only quantitative differences are possible ⇒ commercial banks are not required to be
explicitly modelled because they do not affect the direction of model results.
Model implicitly comprises Indirect & Direct
central bank producers
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Figure A.2. : Exchange Rates
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Figure A.3. : Responses of M3 −M1 and inf
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Responses to a one standard deviation exchange rate shock (± 2 error stdv).
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